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Abstract—This paper presents a simple yet efficient method for
an anomaly-based Intrusion Detection System (IDS). In reality,
IDSs can be defined as a one-class classification system, where the
normal traffic is the target class. The high diversity of network
attacks in addition to the need for generalization, motivate us
to propose a semi-supervised method. Inspired by the successes
of Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) for training deep
models in semi-unsupervised setting, we have proposed an end-
to-end deep architecture for IDS. The proposed architecture
is composed of two deep networks, each of which trained by
competing with each other to understand the underlying concept
of the normal traffic class. The key idea of this paper is to
compensate the lack of anomalous traffic by approximately
obtain them from normal flows. In this case, our method is
not biased towards the available intrusions in the training set
leading to more accurate detection. The proposed method has
been evaluated on NSL-KDD dataset. The results confirm that
our method outperforms the other state-of-the-art approaches.
I. INTRODUCTION
The significant Internet expansion and also its rising pop-
ularity cause a massive increase in data exchange between
different parties. These data most probably include valuable
information of people, government, and organizations. There-
fore, a reliable defense system is required to prevent misuse
of sensitive information and to detect network vulnerabilities
and potential threats. Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is a
promising solution for providing network security services.
Also, it is considered an effective alternative for conventional
defense systems such as firewall. Previous researches in this
topic, can be divided into two major categories: (1) signature-
based, and (2) anomaly-based [1]. Signature-based approach
is very effective to detect already known attacks which their
patterns are available. However, they are inefficient against
unfamiliar and new intrusions. Conversely, the latter approach
seems more effective owing to its superior performance against
unknown and zero-day network attacks [2].
Generally, supervised methods need to know the specific
characteristics of attacks, while their high diversity makes this
process expensive and probably impossible [3]. This difficulty
makes supervised manner lacks generalization. To overcome
such problem, we have proposed a semi-supervised method. In
contrary to supervised methods which detection is performed
based on the available labeled training data, our method is able
to decide about the unseen incoming network Packet Flows
(PFs).
In recent years, Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have
achieved state-of-the-art performance in various research
fields, especially in computer vision and natural language
processing. These outstanding successes motivate us to take
advantages of deep learning in IDS. Note that, DNNs such
as Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs), can achieve the
remarkable results only if they access to a lot of anno-
tated training samples from all classes. Under the realistic
conditions, there are numerous samples from normal class,
but the abnormal class is often absent during the training,
poorly sampled, or not well defined. In summary, the anomaly
detection task refers to a binary classification task, while there
are not any samples from abnormal/outlier class. Training an
end-to-end DNN in the absence of one class data, is not
straightforward [4].
To address the above-mentioned challenge, We have aimed
to generate simulated anomalous flows, inspired by the Gen-
erative Adversarial Networks (GANs) [5]. Using GAN, we
have proposed an end-to-end deep network for IDS which
is able to effectively detect the network intrusions, even
against unforeseen and new ones. The proposed method is
composed of two main modules, Reconstructor network (R),
and Anomaly detector network (A). Since R and A are
trained adversarially and competitively, they properly learn
the distribution of the feature space of normal PFs. R strives
to fool A, in efforts to manipulate it into detecting R(X)
as a normal PF not a reconstructed version, however, the
training duration ofR network is limited in order to have more
realistic anomalies. On the other hand, The duty of A is to
distinguish between original normal PFs and the reconstructed
ones (abnormal traffic). In other words, A determines whether
the incoming PF, follows the distribution of the feature space
of the normal traffic.
The main contributions of the proposed method are: (1)
Proposing an end-to-end DNN for IDS which is trained adver-
sarially in a GAN-style setting. To the best of our knowledge,
our method is the first end-to-end DNN for semi-supervised
intrusion detection, (2) In our method, training is done merely
using the feature space of the normal PFs. Nevertheless, the
experimental results show the superiority of the proposed
method, even compared to the supervised approaches, due
to its generality. (3) Performance of the proposed method
is better than the other state-of-the-arts in terms of accuracy
while the time complexity is also reduced noticeably. (4) In
the proposed method, the unseen traffic, i.e., anomaly, is
simulationly generated using adversarial training. Hence, the
need for availability of all classes data has been satisfied.
ar
X
iv
:1
90
4.
11
57
7v
1 
 [c
s.L
G]
  2
5 A
pr
 20
19
Encoder Decoder
Target Class
Likelihood 
[0,1]
Normal PFs
FCNN
….
Normal PFs
….
Simulated 
Abnormal PFs
….
 
AR
(a) Training Phase
….
….
….
Enter the Network
Dropped
Incoming Network PFs
FCNN
> 
Target Class
Likelihood
≤ 
Target Class
Likelihood
  
A
𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 
𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 
(b) Test Phase
Fig. 1. Overall scheme of the proposed method for anomaly detection in
computer networks in the stages of training and test. R and A are two
modules of the model which are trained adversarially and competitively. R
includes an encoder-decoder network and A consists of a Fully-Connected
Neural Network (FCNN) ending with a softmax classifier. In training phase,
R parameters are optimized to reconstruct the incoming normal PFs for
generating simulated abnormal traffic while it attempts to achieve an optimum
value for the reconstruction error. Additionally, A can detect if an incoming
network PF belongs to the target class (normal) or it is an outlier (anomaly). In
test phase, The classification is performed based on a predefined threshold.
The simulated abnormal PFs have some deviation from the real anomalies.
Thus, this fact is pointed out by using different colors for simulated abnormal
and real abnormal packets.
II. END-TO-END IDS
In this paper, we have proposed a semi-supervised and end-
to-end deep model for IDS. Accordingly, the abnormal class
data is not available. The key idea of the proposed method
is to solve this problem by simulating anomalous PFs using
original normal traffic. This method comprises two modules
(i.e., networks): (1) R, and (2) A. The former generates
simulated anomalous PFs by reconstructing normal traffic to
obviate the need for the presence of anomaly class in training
phase. The latter detects whether the incoming traffic is normal
or not. R and A are trained adversarially and unsupervisedly
in an end-to-end setting. R reconstructs the incoming PFs to
mislead A over the input type, i.e., normal flow or simulated
abnormal one. Since the original data is available for A,
it is familiar with their concept. Therefore, A does not act
blindly and attempts to reject the simulated anomalous traffic.
These two modules are trained in a GAN-style setting, forming
an end-to-end framework for anomaly detection in IDS. The
difference of our work with the original GAN is the time
which the generator training process stops. R should not
perfectly reconstruct the normal traffic. In our case, simulated
anomalies should have some deviation from the normal traffic,
otherwise, anomalous PFs are not properly generated. A can
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Fig. 2. The architecture of R encoder-decoder network.
also effectively distinguish between real and fake input. After
training process, A knows the distribution of the target class,
i.e., normal traffic, and can simply investigate that each of new
incoming flow follows the distribution or not. Fig. 1 shows an
overview of our proposed method. A detailed explanation ofR
network, A network, joint training of R+A, and the process
of anomaly detection are also provided in this section.
Reconstructor Network: R has simulationly and adverse-
rially generated anomalous traffic in the stage of training by
reconstructing normal incoming PFs. This network gradually
and in competition with A, learns to generate flows similar
to normal ones. To this end, R includes an encoder-decoder
network. Equation 1 shows the function of these components.
{
Encoder: Z = σ(WX + b)
Decoder: X ′ = σ(W ′Z + b′)
(1)
Here, X ∈ Rn is the feature space of the incoming PF,
X ′ ∈ Rn is the feature space of the simulated abnormal PF,
Z ∈ Rm is the latent representation, W and W ′ are weight
matrices, σ and σ′ are element-wise activation functions. The
encoder maps an incoming PF to a latent space and the
decoder attempts to retrieve the simulated anomaly from the
latent space. Note that, if R reconstructs the normal flows
with high precision, they can not play the role of anomalies.
Consequently, the training of R should be stopped before it
be able to perfectly reconstruct the normal flows. In [6], [4],
it has been shown that, by over-training an encoder-decoder
network, we could inpatient the irregular samples and convert
them into a normal concept. In contrary to these works, in
our case, it is not desirable that R encoder-decoder maps the
flows including irregularity to equivalent normal flows by their
reconstruction. Fig. 2 shows the architecture of the R network.
Anomaly detector Network: The A network acts as a
classifier to distinguish between the representation of simu-
lated traffic i.e., abnormal/fake flows, generated by R and
normal traffic i.e., real flows. Previously, in computer vision
community [4], [7], it is investigated that a network like A,
which somehow differs from ours in terms of learning process,
is capable of efficiently detecting the irregular/outlier images.
A includes a sequence of fully-connected layers ending with a
softmax layer (classifier). As mentioned previously, the main
purpose of A is to detect the abnormal incoming PFs. It is
worth mentioning that, the A output indicates the likelihood
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Fig. 3. A network architecture specifying if an incoming PF follows the
target class distribution or not.
of the input following the distribution spanned by the target
class. Hence, outputs can be considered as a target likelihood
score for any given input. The detailed architecture of the A
network is indicated in the Fig. 3.
R+A Adversarial Training: Goodfellow et al. [5] has
introduced an efficient way for adversarial learning of two
networks, Generator (G) and Discriminator (D), called GAN.
GANs aim to generate samples that follow the real data
distribution, through adversarial training of two networks. G
learns to map a latent space like Z sampled from a specific
distribution i.e., pz , to a real data distribution (referred to as
pt). D is trained by maximizing the probability of assigning
the correct label to both the actual data and the fake data
from G, while G is simultaneously trained to minimize the
log(1−D(G(Z))). In other words, G and D play the following
two-players mini-max game:
min
G
max
D
(
EX∼pt [log(D(X))]
+ EZ∼pz [log(1−D(G(Z)))]
) (2)
Similarly, we have jointly and adversarially trained R + A
network, and on the contrary to the purpose of conventional
GANs which learns to generate sample from pt distribution,
R and A are trained to generate sample for abnormal class
and distinguish abnormal flows from normal ones, respectively.
Consequently, the optimum point for stopping the joint training
of R+A differs from conventional GANs. In beside of this,
in our method instead of mapping the latent representation, Z,
to a data sample with the distribution pt, R maps:
X ∼ pt −→ X ′  pt (3)
As stated earlier, pt is the distribution of the target class,
i.e., normal traffic. Since the PFs from the target class are
available for A, thus it knows pt. In this case, A can explicitly
decide whether R(X) follows pt or not. Accordingly, R+A
can be trained by optimizing the following objective:
min
R
max
A
(
EX∼pt [log(A(X))]
+ EX∼pt [log(1−A(R(X)︸ ︷︷ ︸
X′
))]
) (4)
Anomaly Detection: In this part, we have explained the
classification manner of the proposed method. As previously
TABLE I
DATA DISTRIBUTION OF TRAINING AND TEST SETS.
Number of PFs
Class KDDTrain+ KDDTest+
Normal 67343 9711
Anomaly — 12833
TABLE II
BINARY CLASSIFICATION PERFORMANCE COMPARISON.
ACC(%) PR(%) RE(%) FS(%)
AE [9] 88.28 91.23 87.86 89.51
De-noising AE [9] 88.65 96.48 83.08 89.28
Ours A(X) 91.39 89.94 95.56 92.67
discussed, A acts as an anomaly detector, and also derive a
benefit from R. Eventually, the proposed Anomaly Detector
(AD) is formulated merely using A network as follows:
AD(X) =
{
Normal (Target Class) if A(X) > α,
Anomaly (Outlier) Otherwise.
(5)
Where α ∈ (0, 1) is a threshold value.
III. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, We have evaluated our proposed method
on a widely-used dataset known as NSL-KDD1 [8]. The
experimental results along with a thorough comparison are
provided in the following subsections.
A. Implementation Details
The proposed method is implemented using Keras frame-
work and Python ran on the GOOGLE COLAB2. Learning
rate is set equal to 0.001 for both networks and α (Equation
5) is set equal to 0.5. The detailed structure of R and A 3 has
been provided in Section II.
B. Evaluation
As mentioned previously, the assessment is carried out using
the NSL-KDD dataset including two subsets, KDDTrain+
and KDDTest+. Since we have proposed a semi-supervised
method, only the normal records of KDDTrain+ are involved
in the training phase and thus its anomalous records are
unused. Furthermore, for the stage of the test, KDDTest+
is used completely. Table I indicates the data distribution of
training and test sets for the evaluation process.
Our method (A(X)) is evaluated using four measures:
accuracy (ACC), precision (PR), recall (RE) and f-score (FS).
We are able to compare A(X) with methods using the same
test set, i.e., KDDTest+, and also report the performance
results of their work with same metrics. Table II confirms
that A(X) achieves better results compared to another work
included two different methods [9]. Although these meth-
ods are semi-supervised, they used anomalous records of
1NSL-KDD is available at https://github.com/defcom17/NSL KDD
2https://colab.research.google.com
3The trained models of both networks, i.e., R and A, are available
at https://github.com/Bahram-Mohammadi/End-to-End-Adversarial-Learning-
for-Intrusion-Detection-in-Computer-Networks
TABLE III
BINARY CLASSIFICATION ACCURACY COMPARISON. THERE ARE TWO
KINDS OF SUPERVISION FOR METHODS IN THIS TABLE, SUPERVISED (S)
AND SEMI-SUPERVIED (SS).
Method Supervision ACC (%)
S SS
RNN-IDS [10] 83.28
DCNN [11] 85.00
AE [9] 88.28
Sparse AE and MLP [12] 88.39
Random Tree [13] 88.46
De-noising AE [9] 88.65
LSTM [11] 89.00
Random Tree and NBTree [13] 89.24
Ours A(X) 91.39
KDDTrain+ in the validation set. In fact, in this work, the
threshold for distinguishing normal traffic from anomalies are
determined based on the validation set. But abnormal samples
have not been involved in the training phase of A(X) at all.
Nonetheless, we have gained better results in terms of ACC,
RE, and FS.
The selected performance indicator for providing a thorough
comparison with the other state-of-the-art methods is ACC
showing the correct classification rate of all classes. Regarding
Table III, A(X) represents a significant improvement in terms
of accuracy. In our work, simulated abnormal flows are gener-
ated with some deviation from the target class irrespective
of real anomalies. In fact, our decision making process is
not biased towards intrusions which are available in the
training set. Hence, A(X) includes generalization property
helping us to obtain better result even compared to supervised
methods. It is worth mentioning that, the process of detecting
each incoming network PF is done just in 45µs on average.
Therefore, A(X) is capable of properly working in real time.
IV. DISCUSSION
Mode collapse: GANs face an issue arising when the
generator learns only a portion of real-data distribution and
then outputs samples from a single mode, (i.e., the other
modes are ignored). This problem is known as mode collapse
[14]. Mode collapse is no longer exists in our case as R(X)
directly sees all possible flows of the target class data and
implicitly learns the manifold spanned by the target data
distribution.
Unseen class generating: Our proposed method is semi-
supervised, thus we need to somehow obtain the anomalous
PFs from the normal traffic. The simulated anomalous traffic
are generated by R network to play the role of real anomalies.
In fact, we have approximately generated the unseen class data
using the normal traffic to solve the problem of DNNs with
the absence of one class data.
Generalization: If the training process is done irrespective
of the anomalies in the training set, the proposed method is
able to decide about the type of incoming PFs while it is not
biased towards the already known intrusions. In this case, the
proposed method can provide generalization leading to better
detection rate.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a novel semi-supervised
and end-to-end deep learning method for anomaly detection
in IDS. Specifically, our model is composed of two modules,
R and A. These networks are trained competitively in an
adversarial manner. After training phase, R can simulate
anomalies in a way that do not perfectly match with the normal
traffic, while A can distinguish normal PFs from abnormal
traffic. The proposed method has been evaluated on NSL-KDD
dataset and the results demonstrates our method has better
performance compared to the other state-of-the-arts.
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